For Ghana’s president, John Mahama, the trip to Moscow for the third Russia-Africa summit carried more than ceremony. He led his country’s delegation, which included six speakers in the business programme, and came away with agreements on bauxite mining and alumina refining, alongside a Russian commitment to help build Ghana’s first nuclear power plant. Mahama, who studied in the Soviet Union and has praised Moscow’s support for Africa’s anti-colonial struggles, even challenged Vladimir Putin directly over Russia’s coercive recruitment of Ghanaians for its war against Ukraine. His engagement, pragmatic rather than ideological, captures the tension running through Russia’s renewed courtship of the continent.
That courtship was on full display in late October, when African leaders arrived in Moscow for the summit and a procession of diplomatic meetings. The message was clear: Russia wants to renew its engagement with Africa. The Kremlin seeks to portray Russia as a global power returning to the continent, carrying the Soviet legacy of support for anti-colonial movements. Putin also used the occasion to advance a larger geopolitical ambition ahead of his November 19th meeting with Xi Jinping and Donald Trump: restoring the global standing once enjoyed by the Soviet Union. He is searching for what analysts describe as a “new Yalta”, in which he, in Stalin’s role, could bargain with two other great powers over spheres of influence. His references to the Soviet Union’s role in international relations and his massive publicity efforts reflect an attempt to present himself as a statesman with the authority to redraw the world’s political map.
Yet for all Moscow’s claims of uniqueness, “Africa+1” summits are commonplace. European governments and powers across Asia and the Middle East convene similar gatherings to court the continent. A detailed analysis published by the European Council on Foreign Relations, available at https://ecfr.eu/article/choreographing-a-comeback-what-russias-africa-policy-means-for-europe/, examines what this choreographed comeback actually amounts to, and what it means for Europe.
For ordinary Africans, the numbers suggest Moscow’s economic promise remains thin. Putin missed the target he set in 2019 to double trade with Africa to around $40bn in five years; he now aims for $50bn by 2030. Russia’s goods trade with Africa totalled $27bn in 2025, roughly matching its trade with Kazakhstan, while EU-Africa goods trade reached €356bn. Russia accounts for less than 1% of Africa’s inward foreign direct investment stock, far behind China, the US and the EU. Agriculture offers more tangible gains: Russian agricultural exports to Africa reached $2.9bn in the first half of 2026, up 35% in value on the same period in 2025. But the war in Ukraine is disrupting Ukrainian grain exports, creating friction with African governments seeking reliable supplies via the Black Sea, and with the communities that depend on them.
Unable to compete economically, Moscow has shifted its pitch. Putin’s speeches, final declarations and business programmes at the 2019, 2023 and 2026 summits show trade and investment terms falling by more than half in his speeches over seven years, while references to sovereignty gained prominence by 2026, tapping into anti-French and European sentiment, especially in West Africa. References to education and the Russian language nearly doubled in his speeches, and information-related terms more than doubled, largely through new media-forum sessions bringing together Russian and African journalists. Universities and media organisations have been tasked with facilitating cultural cooperation, and can form part of Russia’s wider disinformation campaigns. Energy regained prominence too, drawing on Russia’s nuclear expertise, alongside seemingly uncontroversial themes such as a 2026 declaration on civilian AI, which offers African partners little immediate help.
Behind the rhetoric sits a bureaucratic expansion. After the 2023 summit drew criticism for delivering little benefit to Africa, Putin tasked numerous agencies and state-backed actors with building ties. By 2026 these efforts included two ministerial conferences, a new Department for Partnership with Africa in the foreign ministry, and United Russia’s “For the Freedom of Nations!” movement to bring Russian and African parties into a wider anti-colonial network.
The response from African governments has been measured. They choose partners based on the ability to deliver socio-economic growth, industrialisation and job creation, the things their citizens actually need. Most of Moscow’s core partnerships still rest on security cooperation: forces deployed in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, the Central African Republic, Libya and Equatorial Guinea, formalised defence cooperation with Togo, and a pursued military base in Sudan. Speakers from these eight states rose from 5% of summit contributors in 2019 to 23% in 2026, reaching 30% with Egypt and Ethiopia. Elsewhere, engagement fluctuates. South Africa sent only its foreign ministry’s director general and Nigeria a junior foreign minister in 2026, replacing the presidents who attended in 2019; their business programme speaker counts fell from 14 to five and from seven to three. Speech data show the divide: Putin used ideological vocabulary more than twice as often in 2026 as in 2019, while leaders outside the core group used ideological terms 25% less frequently between 2023 and 2026, with pragmatic vocabulary rising by more than a third.
Moscow’s own competing interests create openings. The former Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin welcomed the Niger coup in 2023 while Russia’s foreign ministry backed ECOWAS in restoring constitutional order; in the CAR, his son Pavel Prigozhin has held on to Wagner’s operations despite the defence ministry’s efforts to absorb them. The Russia-Africa Action Plan for 2027-2029 contains 236 measures, from joint drone, fertiliser and vaccine production to cooperation between the African Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, but these priorities can undermine one another, as the Ghana nuclear project and the recruitment of Ghanaians show.
For Europeans, the lesson from confidential conversations between ECFR’s Africa programme and African policymakers is that governments appreciate pragmatism: acknowledgment of the colonial legacy, and recognition that Africa has options. Framing Europe as “countering” Russia may not land well; the continent does not want to be treated as a bargaining field. Backing African-led projects such as the AfCFTA, which received EU technical and financial support, advancing investment in education, technology and engineering, and staying aligned through forums like the AU-EU Senior Officials Meeting in Addis Ababa, alongside high-level engagement such as German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s attendance at the upcoming German-African Business Summit in Ghana, would signal seriousness. African partners will not wait. What they ask for is reliability, a quality Russian cooperation has yet to achieve, and a grounded belief in multilateralism that both Europe and Africa share.